Abstract-There is growing interest in wireless security methods that provide strong or even perfect secrecy by taking advantage of features of the physical propagation channel. In advantage-based methods, high channel quality in an average or opportunistic sense is exploited between two legitimate nodes, such that nonzero secrecy capacity can be achieved. Since such methods require bounds on the quality of the eavesdropper channel, they are somewhat impractical. Secret key generation based on tracking channel evolution in time division duplex systems is a more attractive option, where two nodes generate secret key bits based on a mutually known random channel. Since the eavesdropper channel is typically independent of the legitimate channel, the key can only be broken by brute force attacks, which are difficult when new keys are continuously generated. In this paper, the information theoretic limits of key generation schemes are investigated, based on the level of estimation error, temporal correlation, and dependence of the eavesdropper and legitimate channels. Three practical candidate key generation schemes are also considered: channel quantization and channel quantization with guardband.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is an important concern for wireless networks where by nature signals are transmitted in a broadcast fashion, and there is growing interest in methods that provide strong or even perfect secrecy by taking advantage of the behavior of wireless channels. For example, if the legitimate users have a channel with an SNR advantage relative to a potential eavesdropper, there exists a nonzero secrecy capacity, allowing finite information to be exchanged without giving any information to the eavesdropper [1] , [2] . For fading channels, pairs of users can signal opportunistically to create an effective SNR advantage relative to an eavesdropper, thus providing nonzero secrecy capacity even when the eavesdropper has an average SNR advantage. A problem with advantage-based methods is that some knowledge or bound about the eavesdropper channel quality is required.
Alternatively, secret keys can be generated based on fluctuations or evolution of the channel state [3] - [5] . In a wireless system with time-division duplex (TDD), the forward and reverse propagation channels are identical by reciprocity. When there is high multipath, rapid fading causes the channel to the eavesdropper to be independent of the legitimate channel. Even for a line-of-sight (LOS) channel without multipath, random movement can cause channel phase fluctuations that are independent at multiple nodes. The evolving channel state information represents common randomness [6] , [7] that can be observed by the legitimate transmitter and receiver, but not at the eavesdropper, allowing keys to be dynamically generated. Since secret key generation only requires channel independence, it may be more practical than advantage-based methods.
In practice, a number of factors limit the rate at which secret key bits can be generated: (1) estimation error, (2) spacetime correlation, and (3) dependence of the eavesdropper and legitimate channel. This paper provides an information theoretic analysis of these factors for vector Gaussian channels, indicating fundamental limits on the number of unique key bits that can be generated per channel realization. In addition to the information theoretic analysis, three simple and practical key generation schemes are considered: channel quantization (CQ) [4] and two new extensions to CQ that include guardband (CQG) or use alternating decision regions (CQA). The methods are simulated for a path-based fading channel model, and their performance is compared in terms of efficiency and the mismatch rate of key bits. Figure 1 depicts the model for a wireless communications system. Nodes 1 and 2 are legitimate users that would like to communicate securely, while node 3 is a potential eavesdropper. Reciprocal vector channels h a = h a are referred to as the forward and reverse channels for legitimate communications, which are estimated by nodes 2 and 1, respectively. Channels h b and h c , on the other hand, convey information to (and are estimated by) the eavesdropper. Due to noise, the nodes have imperfect estimates of the channels, or
II. SYSTEM MODEL
where i is zero-mean complex Gaussian estimation error at node i having variance σ 2 i . Note that the meaning of the elements in the channel vectors is arbitrary and can refer to multiple frequency bins, stacked elements of a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel, or both.
In the analysis, it is assumed that the channels are also zero-mean correlated complex Gaussian random processes, characterized by the covariance matrices
where {r, p} ∈ {a, a , b, c}. For simplicity, it is assumed that the processes are not temporally correlated, which could be achieved by only sampling the links at intervals much
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings Fig. 2 . Graphical representation of quantities for key generation longer than the coherence time or performing a pre-whitening operation. Scenarios with nonzero channel mean can also be handled by subtracting this mean from the channels, as this does not change mutual information. A two-dimensional path-based channel model will be used to describe the links in Figure 1 . The general MIMO channel from transmitter k of node n to receiver i of node m is
where β (m,n) , φ (m,n) , and φ (n,m) are the complex gain, angle of arrival, and angle of departure of the th path, and (x
) is the coordinate of the ith antenna in wavelengths at node m. The general covariance of the links between the nodes is represented as
where i and k are stacked to obtain a standard covariance matrix. Channel variation can arise due to changing gains β , positions of the nodes, or path angles. An important special case is that of a common transmitter n 1 = n 2 = n with close receiver nodes, so that the path angles for the two receivers are identical:
and φ (n,m1) = φ (n,m2) . Assuming that just the transmitter moves randomly in a large area, the covariance reduces to
III. INFORMATION THEORETIC ANALYSIS Figure 2 graphically depicts the quantities to be identified in this section, indicating the number of common key bits that can be generated and how many of these may be received by the eavesdropper. The estimated random channelsĥ a andĥ a are observed by nodes 1 and 2, respectively, and the maximum number of information bits extracted from this process for key generation is I K = I(ĥ a ;ĥ a ). The number of secure bits is the mutual information when the eavesdropper channels are already known or I SK = I(ĥ a ;ĥ a |ĥ b ,ĥ c ). Note that since conditioning can possibly increase mutual information (although not observed in this work), a rigorous definition of safe key bits should be the minimum of I SK and I K .
The number of vulnerable key bits that can be obtained by the eavesdropper is the difference of these two quantities, or
Assuming correlated zero-mean complex Gaussian random vectors for the links, we have
where N r is the number of elements in h r , and covariances of combined (stacked) random vectors are defined aŝ
Straightforward evaluation revealŝ
(10)
Substituting into (7) and simplifying results in
where
Evaluation of the secret key bits I SK gives
where the covariance matrices are again the covariance of the stacked subscripted variables. For many practical scenarios, the eavesdropper will be far away from both nodes 1 and 2, in which caseĥ b andĥ c are independent ofĥ a andĥ a and I SK reduces to (7) , meaning all key bits are safe.
The worst case for security, however, is when the eavesdropper is near one of the nodes. Consider the case where the eavesdropper is near node 1 and only movement of node 2 or scatterers causes variation of h c and h a . With the relative positions of node 1 and 3 fixed, h b is not random and contains no information, and (14) reduces to
and the covariances can be written explicitly aŝ 
A. Example Computations
In this section, numerical values for I K and I SK are presented for the path-based channel model with varying numbers of paths and numbers of antennas. For each plot, the results are averaged over 1000 random covariances, where the paths for each realization have angles uniform on [0, 2π] and equal power, scaled to give total average unit power. Figure 3 plots I K versus the number of paths and the number of transmit and receive antennas N for an SNR of 10 dB, where SNR is the mean squared estimation error divided by mean squared channel gain. For a fixed number of antennas, the shared information saturates with increasing paths, and there is a dramatic increase in the available number of key bits with additional antennas N . Figure 4 plots the relative number of vulnerable bits I VK /I K for a single antenna scenario, where the eavesdropper is located a distance d (in wavelengths) from node 1. Although the eavesdropper can steal most of the key bits for little separation or limited multipath, the key bits are safe for realistic separation and moderate multipath. Figure 5 considers a similar scenario with 4 antennas per user. In this case, although many more key bits can be generated, far richer multipath and separation are required to keep all bits safe. This suggests that adding antennas to enhance the generation rate of key bits potentially leaks increasing information to the eavesdropper.
How much information can be stolen when the eavesdropper has an advantage in SNR or the number of antennas is considered in Figures 6 and 7 . For the single antenna system in Figure 6 the eavesdropper has an SNR of 30 dB compared to 10 dB for the legitimate users. The curves are shifted up slightly, but for moderate multipath and large separation, most key bits are still safe. Figure 7 indicates the result when the eavesdropper has 10 antennas compared to 4 antennas for the legitimate users. Far more paths are required to maintain secrecy of the key, suggesting that key generation schemes may still be vulnerable to eavesdroppers with a large advantage.
IV. PRACTICAL KEY GENERATION METHODS
In this section, three different key generation methods are considered and compared in terms of their efficiency. Only single antenna channels will be considered, but multiple antenna extensions are possible by applying the methods to the multiple dimensions separately. Curves were generated considering 10 5 random channel realizations.
A. Channel Quantization (CQ)
Perhaps the simplest method for generating a random key at nodes 1 and 2 is for the two nodes to simultaneously quantizê h a andĥ a , respectively [4] . Due to estimation error at the two nodes, sometimes the key bits will not match, necessitating some kind of error correction method over a public channel.
The channel quantization (CQ) is performed by dividing the total space of observable channels into equally probable decision regions, each with a unique bit pattern. channels, quantization can be performed individually to multiple independent channels, yielding more key bits per channel observation. This paper considers decision region patterns that are similar to those employed in phase shift keying (PSK) [4] and quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM). Figure 8 depicts results for key generation with CQ using 4PSK regions versus the SNR. The efficiency (Eff) of the key generation is the number of matching key bits at nodes 1 and 2 that can be generated per channel realization, where it is assumed that a symbol mismatch is a deletion. Also plotted is the ideal available key bits I K . For the moderate SNR of 15 dB, it is noted that the symbol error rate (SER) is quite high (around 0.15), which may make forward error correction difficult. Although the method has acceptably low SER for high SNR, the efficiency is far below the theoretical limit. The fact that the Eff and I K curves cross for low SNR is due to the simplistic definition of efficiency.
It should be noted that for practical implementation, any deterministic variation of the channel phase due to carrier offset between nodes should be removed before applying any CQ-like methods, since an eavesdropper can easily derive this variation by looking at the phase difference of channelŝ h b andĥ c . Although not rigorously derived or simulated, it is expected that the fraction of bits that can be stolen by the eavesdropper will follow the same behavior studied in Section III, which is to be considered in future work. 
B. Channel Quantization with Guardband (CQG)
To generalize the CQ idea and reduce key mismatch, channel quantization with guardband (CQG) has been considered that creates N quantization regions with equal probability separated by a specified guardband. When the nodes observe channels within the guardband, a mismatch is likely to occur, and the nodes should not use that channel observation to generate a key symbol. This requires a guardband indicator bit (GIB) to be transferred between the two nodes indicating if the channel has been observed in the guardband. An OR rule appears to have the best performance, where the symbol is discarded if either node has GIB=1. Note that he GIB provides no information to the eavesdropper about any key symbols. By properly adjusting the size of the guardband, the likelihood of the nodes making a mistake near quantization region edges can be made small. When guardband is set to 0, CQG can be thought of as a generalized version of CQ [4] that exploits both amplitude and phase fluctuations.
A simple method for generating optimal decision regions is proposed here based on QAM. Figure 9 depicts the parameters of the QAM decision regions, and for regions symmetric with respect to the I and Q axes, the problem can be considered in just one dimension on the positive I axis. Here, γ is the desired minimum guardband between regions, and x ∈ [x n , x n+1 − γ] is the extent of the nth decision region.
The basic problem is to find the x n such that the regions are equally probable, or
for constant C with the required guardband, or
The required regions (assuming unit-variance zero-mean Gaussian statistics on x) are obtained using an iterative procedure:
1. Set initial decision regions according to x 1 = γ/2, x n+1 = x n + γ for n = 1, . . . , N − 1 and x N +1 = ∞, which puts all non-guardband probability in the N th decision region. 2. Compute probability taken by the guardband regions:
Compute updated decision regions by trying to distribute probability not used in guardbands equally to the regions, or for each n = 2, . . . , N − 1 compute Figure 10 shows the results for 256QAM generated with N = 4, γ = 0.1, and a tolerance of 10 −6 , requiring only 9 iterations. Figure 11 shows the performance of 4QAM (same as 4PSK for CQ) for 15 dB SNR versus guardband ranging from 0 to 4σ. Although the efficiency drops linearly with the increasing guardband, the SER drops exponentially allowing a level to be chosen that can be overcome with conventional error control techniques.
C. Channel Quantization Alternating (CQA)
A final CQ method, referred to as channel quantization alternating (CQA) is considered where alternating staggered quantization maps are used instead of guardband. Figure 12 depicts the modified procedure of specifying the quantization regions, where for √ N desired regions per dimension, 2 √ N regions are first found having equal probability. At the node designated as the transmitter (TX), pairs of adjacent intervals are assigned ascending quantization values (QV) and alternating quantization maps (QM). When TX observes the channel in a given region, the QV symbol is added to its key and only the QM value is transmitted over the public channel to the receiver (RX). As can be seen, the TX chooses the quantization map where the observed channel is farthest from an edge, reducing the probability of mismatch. The RX observes the reciprocal channel, and depending on the received map indicated by the QM bit, assigns the corresponding QV symbol to the key. Like the GIB, the QM bit provides virtually no information to the eavesdropper. Figure 13 depicts the performance of CQA for N = 4 and N = 16 quantization regions and varying SNR, indicating efficiency much closer to the theoretical maximum.
V. CONCLUSION This paper has presented information theoretic limits for key generation schemes for correlated vector Gaussian channels. Three simple key generation methods were presented, and improving the efficiency and secrecy of these methods is the subject of ongoing work.
